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Treating spectrum of diﬀerent bandwidths as essentially distinct inputs
needed for possibly diﬀerent types of services has formed the core of spectrum
analysis in academic research so far. New technological advances, such as
cognitive radio, now allow us to move away from this inﬂexibility and to
open up the new possibility of making diﬀerent spectrum bands compatible.
Spectrum, it is envisaged, is to become divisible and homogeneous. Auctions
for this case have not been previously analyzed. By suitably adapting the
Anglo-Dutch spectrum auction of Binmore and Klemperer (2000) and the
split-award procurement auction of Anton and Yao (1989) and combining
the adapted versions, we set out an ‘Anglo-Dutch split-award auction’ for
divisible and homogeneous radio spectrum. An important feature of the game
is a post-auction stage where the ﬁrms who have acquired some spectrum
compete in the production of radio services. The equilibrium of the complete
information game is completely characterized and important diﬀerences with
the procurement auction highlighted. Finally, we compare the performance
of our auction mechanism with a complete information form of the Binmore
– Klemperer mechanism.
JEL Classiﬁcation: L10, L50, L96
Keywords: radio spectrum, spectrum trading, imperfect competition.Contents
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The study of Flexible Spectrum Management, typiﬁed by the E2R programme,
focuses on technical mechanisms to increase the eﬃciency of spectrum usage. The
pursuit of technical eﬃciency has been parallelled by a world-wide shift towards the
greater reliance of market mechanisms to achieve a parallel objective of allocative
eﬃciency. This paper examines one such mechanism - the spectrum auction - which
has been increasingly relied upon in the United States, the United Kingdom and
elsewhere in Europe.1
In this paper we consider a particular form of auction mechanism that is par-
ticularly relevant for the new telecommunications services sector in the EU, namely
the spectrum allocation among a small number of ﬁrms, who then compete in the
downstream market for the delivery of various services. While our focus is on maxi-
mizing license revenues, the spectrum allocation mechanism we are going to propose
starts from a base level importance attached to consumer welfare. Simply put, this
means each ﬁrm in the downstream market will have a minimum market share and
a monopoly situation does not arise.
While the important theoretical contribution by Milgrom (2000) has rightly
placed auctions in the limelight in engineering spectrum allocations, and quite a
few papers deal with spectrum auctions,2 only three papers explicitly address auc-
tions with some downstream market interaction possibility (Jehiel and Moldovanu,
2001; Janssen, 2006; Janssen and Karamychev, forthcoming). None of these papers
consider, however, the textbook style imperfect competition oligopoly model that
perhaps captures better the market interaction. To ﬁll this gap in the literature, we
allow for a quantity setting oligopoly competition in the market interaction stage
after spectrum has been allocated.
Our basic auction-and-market-interaction model extends the pure auction model
1See Bourse et al (2007) for a comprehensive overview of EU spectrum policy.
2See Jehiel and Moldovanu (2003) for a comprehensive survey of how auctions have been used
by various countries for spectrum allocations. The survey also oﬀers some guidance to related
papers by academic researchers. See also Klemperer (2002).
1– an Anglo-Dutch auction – initially proposed for the sale of the British 3G tele-
com licenses. This auction method is outlined in detail by its two main advocates,
Professor Ken Binmore and Professor Paul Klemperer in Binmore and Klemperer
(2002). Brieﬂy, the Anglo-Dutch auction ﬁrst selects n+1 bidders out of m bidders,
m > n+1, using an ascending bid auction (alternatively known as English auction)
for the right to further bid in a second-round auction for n licenses. The price thus
rises until n + 1 bidders remain. In the second round, each remaining bidder sub-
mits a sealed bid at or above the price at which the ﬁrst-round bidding had stopped;
the top n bidders in the second-round bidding win the licenses and pay either their
respective bids or the n-th highest bid.3 When the winning bidders pay their re-
spective bids, the procedure is known as ﬁrst-price auction; when the bidders pay
n-th highest bid, it is a simple extension of what is known as second-price auction
(or Vickrey auction).
Binmore and Klemperer highlighted three aspects as the auction’s principal ob-
jectives: eﬃciency of spectrum assignment, promotion of competition, and realiza-
tion of the full economic value.4 Eﬃciency meant awarding the licenses to bidders
with the best business plans, which in turn was expected to translate into relatively
higher valuations for the licenses. It is well known, however, that eﬃciency, revenue
maximization and promotion of competition often do not go hand-in-hand; some
compromise is expected. Both Binmore–Klemperer recommended auction and the
auction mechanism in this paper follow this principle of balance of objectives.
At this stage we like to note some special features of the particular auction
that was originally proposed for the British telecom licenses, because some of these
features motivate us to adapt/modify the Anglo-Dutch auction the way we do (as
3Actually, there was also a third stage involved because of the heterogeneity of the licenses. The
third stage was another auction known as ‘simultaneous ascending price auction,’ used in the sale
of spectrum by the US FCC. In this auction, multiple bidders bid for various units of the licenses
in rounds. The bidding would go on until there are two ﬁnal rounds of bidding in which no new
bids are submitted for any of the licenses. The licenses are then disposed to the highest bidders in
the last active phase, with each winning bidder paying what they had bid in the last active phase.
4A total of four licenses had been auctioned oﬀ.
2detailed further below). First of all, the licenses were heterogenous and had diﬀer-
ent amounts (and types) of spectrum associated with each license, and which were
chosen by the licensing authority (although in imperfect anticipation of the likely
market demands that are going to prevail). This heterogeneity – both in quantity
and quality – is likely to involve some inevitable ineﬃciency given that various bid-
ders have diverse interests. As for volumes of spectrum per license, any ad hoc
speciﬁcation by the licensing authority would leave unexploited many other possi-
ble speciﬁcations that the bidders as a whole (or even the majority of the bidders)
might have strictly preferred.5 We therefore aim to disentangle the “lumpiness” of
the licenses by treating spectrum as a perfectly divisible commodity and letting the
bidders themselves express their preferences for the continuum of this divisible unit.
We do this simpliﬁcation by dispensing with the heterogeneity of the spectrum’s
quality; we will assume all spectrum is identical in that they are inputs to generate
the same (or similar) type of service. Thus, in the product market we consider
interactions between ﬁrms producing a homogeneous good. Finally, we model the
spectrum commodity as an essential ingredient to produce the ﬁnal output (or ser-
vice) by assuming a Leontief-type production technology (see section 2 for details).
The case of divisible, homogeneous spectrum has not been previously analyzed.
The two aspects – homogeneity and divisibility – are of course closely related. Treat-
ing spectrum of diﬀerent bandwidths as essentially two distinct inputs needed for
possibly diﬀerent types of services formed the core of spectrum analysis in academic
research so far. But with the new technological possibility of making diﬀerent spec-
trum bands compatible6 This new and the possibility of servicing more customers
with better spectrum capacity, with the latter becoming increasingly feasible due
5This, in itself, need not be a bad thing for the licensing authority. As it is commonly known,
given the number of licenses to be awarded, restricting to exogenous, and possibly heterogenous,
quantity allocations in licenses (as opposed to endogenously determined allocation per license) may
limit collusion among bidders; see Anton and Yao, 1989; Klemperer, 2002; Janssen, 2006.
6In particular, these new possibilities are associated with cognitive radio–see Qinetic (2006) and
the E2R programme.
3to allowance for spectrum trading by various ﬁrms, makes the analysis of allocation
of a continuum of spectrum shares very much relevant. If spectrum can be traded
by license holders according to individual demand conditions, then consideration of
an initial variable allocation of spectrum based on bidders’ individual bids is not an
unrealistic mechanism.
Given divisible spectrum, rather than a discrete number of (possibly heteroge-
nous) licenses, we will consider the split-award auction mechanism that is often used
for government procurement of a ﬁxed volume of certain services and formally an-
alyzed by Anton and Yao (1989). In the split-award procurement auction, bidders
submit sealed bids for their respective shares in the service contract and the gov-
ernment (or the auctioneer) chooses the split that maximizes the sum total of bids.
We adapt this split-award mechanism in one of the stages comprising the spectrum
assignment problem.
In summary, our spectrum assignment game involves fours stages. The govern-
ment has a ﬁxed amount of spectrum to be allocated. In stage 1, a given number
of potential ﬁrms participate in an ascending price auction to win a minimum pre-
speciﬁed amount of the available spectrum and to be able to further bid for additional
spectrum in a subsequent sealed-bid auction. All but two ﬁrms are eliminated in
the ascending price auction and the remaining two ﬁrms pay the ﬁnal dropout price,
earn the pre-speciﬁed minimum spectrum and then proceed to stage 2. In stage
2, the two ﬁrms submit bids for various shares of the remaining spectrum, and in
stage 3 the government chooses the split that maximizes the total bids. Finally in
stage 4, the two ﬁrms compete in the service provision market and their outputs are
constrained, through a Leontief production technology, by the amount of spectrum
won in the ascending price and split-award auctions. We call this procedure the
Anglo-Dutch, split-award auction. More formal description of this game appears in
section 3.
The diﬀerences between the Anglo-Dutch auction of Binmore and Klemperer and
the auction mechanism we propose in this paper are several. First, the spectrum
4licenses in our context allow for a continuum of shares as opposed to a discrete
number of licenses and this requires a diﬀerent auction technique in the form of
split awards. Second, the ascending bid auction of Binmore and Klemperer ensures
a minimal starting bid for the eventual n+1 bidders who participate in the sealed-
bid auction stage for n discrete licenses. In contrast, the ascending bid stage of our
auction selects two ﬁrms for a guaranteed minimal amount of spectrum each with
the possibility of additional spectrum; importantly, the option values of acquiring
additional spectrum at some price do get reﬂected in the bidders’ strategies during
the ascending price auction, thus the ascending bid stage serves both for screening
and surplus extractions. The minimal spectrum awarded to the two ﬁrms through
the ascending bid auction also ensure that the market never degenerates into a
monopoly. The basic principles behind Binmore–Klemperer method and our auction
method are, however, similar – generate high overall revenues for the government
and ensure some necessary competition in the downstream market for consumer
welfare.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the downstream
market interaction. In section 3, we formally outline the spectrum assignment game,
followed by an analysis of the game in section 4. In section 5, we illustrate our results
from section 4 using a simple linear market demand and quadratic cost curves.
Section 6 concludes.
2 The Anglo-Dutch, Split-Award Spectrum Auc-
tion Game
The spectrum manager will award a given volume of spectrum, x, in two phases:
ﬁrst, a number of potential competitors will be screened down to two who both
are given a threshold amount of spectrum z; then the same two ﬁrms compete
for any share of the remaining spectrum, x − 2z. The initial screening and then
disbursement of spectrum follows a combination of Anglo-Dutch auction mechanism
5of Binmore–Klemperer and the split-award auction mechanism of Anton–Yao. The
precise mechanism, to be referred as Γ, is as follows:
Stage 1. m interested ﬁrms, who all know each others’ cost functions and the
common market demand function, take part in an ascending bid auction. Bids
rise continuously until all but two ﬁrms drop out. Denote the bid at which
(m − 3)rd ﬁrm drops out by ξ. The two surviving ﬁrms, denoted as ﬁrm 1
and ﬁrm 2, pay each ξ for a guaranteed amount of spectrum, z, and then they
proceed to compete in stage 2.
Stage 2. Firms 1 and 2 submit sealed bids (p1(α),p2(α)), ∀α ∈ [0,1] where α
denotes ﬁrm 1’s share of x − 2z and 1 − α denotes ﬁrm 2’s share.
Stage 3. The government chooses the split α∗ to maximize the total bids:
g(α) ≡ p1(α) + p2(α). (1)
Any ties resulting in the highest total bids will be broken using uniform prob-
ability. The bidders pay their submitted bids for the split chosen by the
government.
Stage 4. Given their spectrum capacity constraints r1 = z + α∗(x − 2z) and
r2 = z + (1 − α∗)(x − 2z), the two ﬁrms then go into the market competition
stage and produce the spectrum services, q1 and q2. The market price is
determined according to a downward-sloping inverse market demand function
P = D(Q) where Q = q1 + q2. The two ﬁrms ﬁnally realize their proﬁts less
respective sum total of bids in the two auctions, ξ + p1(α∗) and ξ + p2(α∗). ||
We need to solve the extensive form game Γ backwards. Initially we focus on the
last three stages of the game for any two ﬁrms selected in stage 1. The analysis of this
subgame will follow closely Anton and Yao’s analysis of a split-award procurement
auction; our split-award spectrum bidding game is a mirror image of Anton and
Yao’s procurement auction. Restriction to two ﬁrms for the stage 2 bidding, is to
keep the analysis tractable: with two ﬁrms, each ﬁrm’s bidding depends only on its
6own share as it also uniquely determines the other ﬁrm’s share; for more than two
ﬁrms each ﬁrm’s bidding strategy would depend not only on its own share but also
on other ﬁrms’ shares. We do not believe the extra complications due to more than
two ﬁrms would alter the main message of our paper qualitatively.
The procedure for calculating the equilibrium bids are set out in Anton and Yao
(1989), and adapted to our spectrum sale setting in section 4. These form a Nash
equilibrium at the bidding stage of the game.
The important feature of the second stage bidding game is the minimal informa-
tion requirement on the part of the government, who needs to observe only the bids
by the two ﬁrms. Note also that the government’s objective function is a balance
between revenue maximization and guaranteeing consumer welfare through some
minimal competition in the downstream market. This is achieved by deciding that
only x−2z spectrum will be distributed through the split-awards auction; by giving
at least z spectrum to each of two ﬁrms, the downstream market never becomes a
monopoly.
3 Stage 4: The Downstream Market
We consider a single local market with a small number of ﬁrms with some market
power and providing a homogeneous service at a market price P. In this section,
the number of ﬁrms, n, is unspeciﬁed. In the sections to follow, we will consider
n = 2.
Firm i produces output qi, i = 1,2,     ,n and the total output Q =
 n
i=1 qi.
The inverse demand curve is given by P = D(Q); D′(Q) < 0. Units of output are
customer-minutes of some service requiring radio channels as an input.
To keep the analysis simple we consider a decreasing returns to scale Leontief
technology
qi = min[ri,ψ(y)] (2)
where y is a vector of other inputs such as base-stations and labour. Thus output of
7ﬁrm i is constrained by the volume ri of radio channel licences issued to ﬁrm i. We
assume that ﬁrm i has acquired the spectrum at a price pi. Costs include a set-up
cost Fi, so total costs are given by
TCi(qi,ξ,pi,Fi) = Fi + ξ + pi + Ci(qi), (3)
where Ci( ) depends exogenously on the given factor prices for inputs y with C′
i( ) >
0, C′′
i ( ) > 0.
In a constrained Cournot-Nash equilibrium, ﬁrm i faces a capacity constraint
qi ≤ ri. Given ﬁxed costs and previous bid prices, it then maximizes gross proﬁts
at stage 4 given by
πi = Pqi − Ci(qi) (4)
subject to the capacity constraint, taking the output of all other ﬁrms,
 n
j =i qj = ˜ qi,
as given. Notice that licensing costs, ξ + pi, are now part of ﬁxed costs and only
aﬀect the ﬁrm’s participation constraint at stage 1.
To carry out this constrained optimization programme, deﬁne the Lagrangian
Li = πi + λi(ri − qi) +  iπi (5)
where λi ≥ 0 and  i ≥ 0 are Lagrangian multipliers associated with constraints
ri ≥ qi and πi ≥ 0 respectively. The Kuhn-Tucker ﬁrst-order conditions for a
maximum are:
(1 +  i)[P + qiD
′(Q) − C
′
i(qi)] = λi (6)
 iπi = λi(ri − qi) = 0. (7)
The left-hand-side of equation (6) is deﬁned as (1+ i)f(qi). At stage 4 we must have
that πi > 0 so that  i = 0. Further, if f(qi) > 0 then λi > 0, which in turn implies
qi = ri so that ﬁrm i uses all its acquired channels producing at full-capacity. If on
the other hand f(qi) = 0, then the capacity constraint need no longer be binding
so that qi ≤ ri and there might be spare radio channels and capacity.7 In this last
case, qi is given by (6) with  i = λi = 0.
7It is not possible to have f(qi) < 0 at an optimal choice of qi because (6) would be violated.
8The Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the production stage of the game (subsequently




i(qi)] = λi, i = 1,2,...,n
λi(ri − qi) = 0, i = 1,2,...,n






which gives 2n + 2 equations in qi, λi, Q and P, given ri, ξ and pi, i = 1,2,...,n.
4 Stages 2 and 3: Equilibrium bids
In this section, we characterize various properties of equilibrium bidding in stage 2
of the game Γ. Since a number of our results draw upon Anton–Yao’s equilibrium
characterization, most of the results will be stated without formal proofs.
4.1 Monotone bidding
The ﬁrms’ duopoly proﬁts (excluding the spectrum costs) for the split, α, will be
denoted by πi(α), i = 1,2. We assume that π′
1( ) ≥ 0, π′′
1( ) ≤ 0 and π′
2( ) ≤
0, π′′
2( ) ≤ 0. That is, having a greater share of the available spectrum can do no
harm to a ﬁrm’s proﬁts and the marginal impact (on proﬁts) is weakly decreasing.8
We are going to present some equilibrium properties of the bid functions (p1(α),p2(α)).
We will assume that the ﬁrms adopt, in equilibrium, (weakly) monotone bid func-
tions: p∗
1
′(α) ≥ 0, p∗
2
′(α) ≤ 0 ((*) to denote equilibrium). We assume monotone
bidding to make the equilibrium analysis tractable. But there is also the obvious
intuition in favor of monotone bidding. Deﬁne total revenue by
g(α) = p1(α) + p2(α). (8)
8This assumption may not be as innocuous as it may sound. With more spectrum available, a
ﬁrm may not be able to convince its rival that it will not expand output along the reaction curve.
9Lemma 1. (Price equivalence) Suppose that (p∗
1(α),p∗
2(α)) is a Nash equilibrium in
(weakly) monotone bidding, and let g∗ be the associated total revenue to the govern-
ment. Then, the equilibrium bids satisfy g∗ = p∗
1(1) = p∗
2(0).
Proof. Suppose the claimed equality fails to hold. Then one of the bid prices must
be smaller than g∗ as g∗ is the total revenue to the government at the optimal choice.
If p∗
2(0) < g∗, then the outcome α = 0 is not optimal for the government.
Let ǫ = g∗ − p∗
2(0) > 0, and consider ﬁrm 1’s bid as follows:
p1(α) =

   




2, if α > α∗
p∗
1(α) − ǫ
3, if α = α∗
0, if α < α∗,
(9)
where α∗ is an optimal choice for the government in the original equilibrium. In
fact, given that the government’s optimal choice can be random (with ties in total
bids over multiple values of α), we take α∗ to be the best ex-post equilibrium choice
from the point of view of ﬁrm 1.
Below we will argue that given ﬁrm 2’s equilibrium bidding, p∗
2(α), the modiﬁed
bidding strategy p1(α) in (9) will imply α∗ is the unique new optimal choice for
the government at which ﬁrm 1 receives strictly higher payoﬀ than his best ex-post
payoﬀ in the original equilibrium.
First observe that p∗
1(0) = p∗
2(1) = 0, as a ﬁrm cannot be expected to submit a




given that α = 0 is not an optimal choice originally and the equilibrium bid functions




2 > 0 for α > α∗
(the ﬁrst inequality follows because p∗









   








3, if α = α∗
p∗
2(α), if α < α∗,
(10)
10which implies α∗ is the new unique optimal choice for the government for the mod-
iﬁed bidding p1(α) by ﬁrm 1.
Finally, ﬁrm 1 is strictly better oﬀ compared to his best ex-post outcome in the
original equilibrium (p∗
1,p∗
2), because all that is diﬀerent in this new unique optimal
choice of α∗ is that ﬁrm 1 pays a strictly lower price p∗
1(α) − ǫ
3 (rather than p∗
1(α))
for the same split α = α∗. Thus, p∗
1 is not a best response – a contradiction. Hence,
it must be that p∗
2(0) = g∗. The case for p∗
1(1) < g∗ is analogous. Q.E.D.
4.2 Eﬃciency and Monopoly Outcomes
Staying with the duopoly case, the analogy of joint production costs in the procure-
ment auction of Anton and Yao is joint operating proﬁts
B(α,z,x) = π1(α,z,x) + π2(α,z,x) (11)
where πi(α,z,x) are operating proﬁts for ﬁrm i = 1,2 at stage 4 given a split [α,1−α]
of the spectrum oﬀered at stage 2, x − 2z, and x is the total spectrum available for
the market. Then for z ∈ [0, x
2] we have
π1(1,z,x) > 0, π2(1,z,x) ≥ 0 with π2(1,0,x) = 0 (12)
π1(0,z,x) ≥ 0 with π1(0,0,x) = 0, π2(0,z,x) > 0 (13)
p1(0,z,x) = p2(1,z,x) = 0. (14)
To ease the notation in what follows we abbreviate B(α,z,x) to simply B(α) and
similarly pi(α,z,x) to pi(α) for i = 1,2 (as in the previous section).
Then the case where all the spectrum is available at stage 2, z = 0, is the
spectrum auction counterpart of the model of Anton and Yao. In what follows let
ﬁrm 1 be the low cost ﬁrm with c1 < c2 and 0 < d1 < d2 for the decreasing returns
to scale case, d1 < d2 < 0 for the increasing returns to scale case. Then B(1) > B(0)
and the counterpart of proposition 1 in Anton and Yao with z ≥ 0 is:
Proposition 1. Suppose x and z ∈ [0, x
2] are given. Suppose also that B(1) > B(α)
11for all α ∈ [0,1). Then α = α∗ = 1 is the unique bidding equilibrium that satisﬁes
g







1 = B(1) − B(0) > 0
Π
∗
2 = π2(1,z,x) ≥ 0 for z ≥ 0
where net9 and operating proﬁts, Πi and πi respectively, are related by
Πi(α) = πi(α) − pi(α); i = 1,2. (15)
It follows from deﬁnitions (8), (11) and (15) that the sum of net proﬁts is given by
Π1(α) + Π2(α) = π1(α) + π2(α) − (p1(α) + p2(α)) = B(α) − g. (16)
4.3 Implicit Price Collusion and Split-Award Outcomes
Now in contrast to Proposition 1, suppose that there exists α ∈ [0,1) such that
Suppose B(1) < B(α). Then the following proposition mirrors the procurement
auction of Anton and Yao.
Proposition 2. Let N = {α | B(α) ≥ B(1),α ∈ (0,1)} be the set of outcomes for
which joint operating proﬁts are greater than the monopoly proﬁts of the low cost
ﬁrm 1. Then N is the set of split-award equilibria. These equilibria α∗ ∈ N are
characterized by:
g









2 ∈ [B(0) − g
∗,B(α
∗) − B(1)]. (19)
Propositions 1 and 2 completely characterize the equilibria at stage 2 of the game.
In Proposition 2, (17) determines the revenue which from (16) determines total net
proﬁts. Then (18) and (19) determine the division of total proﬁts between the two
bidders. Given net proﬁts and operating proﬁts given at stage 4, the equilibrium bid
9Our deﬁnition of ‘net’ proﬁts excludes the bid price paid at stage 1.
12prices are then determined and we have therefore characterized for both ﬁrms their
equilibrium bid prices and net proﬁts at stage 2. Following AY for B(1) < B(α) the
equilibria satisﬁes the following corollary:
Corollary. Let α ∈ N. Then the minimum for the revenue, and the maxima for
joint total proﬁts and individual total proﬁts, occur at the split-award outcome for
which joint operating proﬁts are maximized.
5 Stage 1: The Initial Ascending Bid Auction
Consider m > 2 interested ﬁrms who take part in an ascending bid auction. We
assume a quadratic cost function
Ci(qi) = ciqi + diq
2
i , i = 1,2 (20)
and that cost parameters can be ranked so that
c1 < c2 < c3      < cm (21)
d1 < d2 < d3      < dm. (22)







3(q)    < C
′
m(q) for all q ≥ 0 ;
C1(q) < C2(q) < C3(q)    < Cm(q) for all q ≥ 0.
Denote by Πi(α∗(i,j)) where i  = j and i,j ∈ (1,2,      m) the net proﬁt to
ﬁrm i earned in the downstream market when i and j enter stage 2 bidding and
subsequently win a share α∗(i,j) of the spectrum on oﬀer. What dropout bid a ﬁrm
chooses at any point in the ascending bid auction would depend on its expectation
of the sequence of dropouts in the game from that point onwards. In particular, if a
ﬁrm i were to continue in the auction (rather than drop out immediately), it must
choose to do so expecting to win the auction with another ﬁrm j and making non-
negative net proﬁts, Πi(α∗(i,j)) ≥ 0, from stage 2 onwards. This requires solving
13the extensive form game of dropouts explicitly. Given the clear ranking of ﬁrms in




∗(i,j)), for any {i,j} pair such that i < j ;
Πi(α
∗(i,j)) > Πj(α
∗(i,j)) >     > Πk(α
∗(i,k)), for any {i,j,    ,k}
such that i < j <     < k . (23)
Given (23), it can be veriﬁed that the following is an equilibrium sequence of
dropout bids:
bm < bm−1 <     < b3 < b2 < b1, (24)











In fact, in any equilibrium ﬁrms 1 and 2 will always win and their dropout bids are
given uniquely as in (24). The reasoning for the dropout decisions is standard –
same as why truthful bidding is an equilibrium in a private-value, English auction.
Thus, ﬁrms 1 and 2 win the ascending bid stage and both pay the entry fee
ξ = Π3(α
∗(1,3)), (25)
and proceed to stage 2 bidding.10
10We assume that ﬁrm 3 will drop out at Π3(α∗(1,3)) even though it can continue up to just
below Π2(α∗(1,2)) and then drop out because the latter strategy does not yield ﬁrm 2 any chance
of a win in which it would make positive proﬁt. In fact, under incomplete information about rival
ﬁrms’ costs (as opposed to the complete information assumption made in this paper), a ﬁrm will
never bid above its true valuation (i.e., proﬁt).
146 Comparison with Binmore–Klemperer Auction
How does our auction mechanism perform relative to Binmore– Klemperer mech-
anism? In one respect, such comparison may not even be appropriate due to an
important diﬀerence. The division of Binmore–Klemperer mechanism into ascend-
ing bid auction and sealed-bid auction was designed in view of the incomplete in-
formation among the bidders about each others’ valuations: ascending bid auction
ensured that the top few bidders would participate in the sealed-bid stage and thus
ensuring the spirit of eﬃciency, whereas sealed-bid stage kept alive the chance of
a relatively ‘weak’ type ﬁrm to be the ultimate winner and thereby prompting the
‘stronger’ types to bid aggressively; also sealed-bid would have minimized the chance
of collusion. In a complete information setup (where ﬁrms know each others’ cost
functions and thus valuations from various split awards), which we assume (partly for
tractability reasons), Binmore–Klemperer mechanism reduces to a solitary sealed-
bid auction; their ascending-bid stage no longer gives any added value as only the
‘best’ two ﬁrms (best in terms of cost eﬃciency, given a ranking of ﬁrms is possible)
would be in a position to win any spectrum, with the third-best ﬁrm disciplining
the top two ﬁrms’ bids in the sealed-bid stage.11
Despite removing one main ingredient of Binmore–Klemperer mechanism – the
incomplete information among bidders – a complete-information analogue of Binmore–
Klemperer mechanism may still oﬀer an important benchmark with respect to which
our mechanism can be assessed. With this objective, below we analyze a reduced-
form Binmore–Klemperer mechanism, which is a sealed-bid ﬁrst-price auction in-
volving top three ﬁrms who each bid for one of two identical licenses, with each
license awarding half the overall amount of spectrum, x.12
11The idea is that the dropout bid of a weaker ﬁrm in the ascending-bid stage can always be
improved by a stronger ﬁrm, because the stronger ﬁrm can expect to achieve at least as much
proﬁt as a weaker ﬁrm in the subsequent sealed-bid stage.
12Allowing the licenses to be heterogeneous would have required analysis of a much more compli-
cated auction. Our objective is to oﬀer at least one comparison to assess our mechanism. Also, we
restrict to ﬁrst-price auction for the reduced Binmore–Klemperer game, rather than Vickrey-type
15By analogy with Πi(α∗(i,j)) deﬁned in the previous section, denote by πi(i,j),
where i  = j and i,j ∈ {1,2,3}, the operating proﬁt to ﬁrm i from operation in
the downstream market when i and j win the licenses (that award each half the
spectrum). We assume the following inequalities (without veriﬁcation) that are
quite intuitive:
π1(1,2) > π2(1,2) > π3(1,3) (26)
π1(1,3) > π3(1,3) (27)
π1(1,3) > π2(2,3) (28)
π2(2,3) > π3(2,3) > π3(1,3). (29)
Proposition 3. Consider a sealed-bid ﬁrst-price auction involving ﬁrms 1, 2 and
3 who bid for one of two identical licenses, with each ﬁrm having an ‘exit option’ if
its bid is the joint lowest with at least another ﬁrm’s bid. When there is a tie and
none of the ﬁrms whose bids are tied exercise their exit options, then each tied ﬁrm
is chosen to be a winner with equal probability. Suppose
π1(1,2) > π3(2,3) (30)
and π2(1,2) > π3(2,3). (31)
Then
(b1, b2, b3) = (π3(2,3), π3(2,3), π3(2,3)) (32)
is an equilibrium, in which ﬁrm 3 exercises its ‘exit option’ while ﬁrms 1 and 2 win
a license each and pay their bids.
Proof. First we claim that in any equilibrium ﬁrm 1 must win a license. Sup-
pose not, so that ﬁrms 2 and 3 win licenses. This implies b3 ≤ π3(2,3), because
otherwise ﬁrm 3 will incur losses that it can avoid by submitting zero bid. But
then ﬁrm 1 can deviate from its original bid b1 by submitting ˆ b1 = π3(2,3) + ǫ <
min{π1(1,2),π1(1,3)} where ǫ > 0 and is suﬃciently small; π3(2,3) + ǫ < π1(1,2)
auction, because our split-award mechanism involves pay-your-own-bid by the ﬁrms.
16given (30), and π3(2,3)+ǫ < π1(1,3) given (28) and the ﬁrst inequality of (29). Thus,
by deviating ﬁrm 1 would win a license and make a positive proﬁt; a contradiction.
Similarly, ﬁrm 2 also must win a license in any equilibrium. Suppose not, so that
ﬁrms 1 and 3 win licenses. This implies b3 ≤ π3(1,3), because otherwise ﬁrm 3 will
incur losses that it can avoid by submitting zero bid. But then ﬁrm 2 can deviate
from its original bid b2 by submitting ˆ b2 = π3(1,3)+ˆ ǫ < min{π2(1,2),π2(2,3)} where
ˆ ǫ > 0 and is suﬃciently small; π3(1,3) + ˆ ǫ < π2(1,2) given the second inequality in
(26), and π3(1,3) + ˆ ǫ < π2(2,3) given (29). Thus, by deviating ﬁrm 2 would win a
license and make a positive proﬁt; a contradiction.
Next we claim that in equilibrium ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2’s bids must be tied: b1 = b2.
If not, suppose b1 > b2. Then clearly ﬁrm 1 can slightly lower its bid and still exceed
ﬁrm 2’s bid, thus ensuring that it wins a license and pays less overall and thereby
making a higher net proﬁt. On the other hand, if b2 > b1 then by a similar logic ﬁrm
2 can slightly lower its bid, retain its license-winning position and make a higher
net proﬁt.
It remains to verify that (32) is indeed an equilibrium. Given that b3 = π3(2,3) =
bj, it is clearly optimal for ﬁrm i to bid bi = π3(2,3) where i  = j and i,j  = 3 (by
(30) and (31)). Also, given b1 = π3(2,3) = b2, ﬁrm 3 does no worse by bidding
b3 = π3(2,3) and subsequently exercising its exit option. Note that if ﬁrm 3 were
not to exercise its exit option, it may well end up with ﬁrm 1 (because of the tie-
breaking rule), in which case it would make losses. Q.E.D.
Firm 3’s bid puts a ﬂoor to the top two ﬁrms’ bids. Actually, ﬁrm 3 need not
actively participate in bidding. So long as the licensing authority can bring in ﬁrm
3 at a “small cost” (by oﬀering some direct inducement) to participate in the sealed-
bid auction, ﬁrms 1 and 2 will end up bidding π3(2,3) even in the two-bidder auction
involving ﬁrms 1 and 2.
177 The Case of Linear Demand and Quadratic Costs
We now study the split award and Binmore-Klemperer auctions for particular func-






a − bQ, Q < a
b;
0, Q ≥ a
b.
(33)
We ﬁrst examine the split award auction for the special case of the game where
z = 0 so that it is possible for on ﬁrm to emerge as the monopoly producer. We ﬁrst
consider a symmetric n-ﬁrm equilibrium at stages 2 and 3 and then an asymmetric
duopoly.
7.1 Split Award Auction: Symmetric Case for z = 0
Let Πi = πi − pi where π are operating proﬁts excluding spectrum costs. At the
production stage the ﬁrm then maximizes πi with respect to qi. Let πNE
i and πM be
the operating proﬁts per ﬁrm for in the CNE and a (one site) monopoly respectively.
The following Lemma is crucial for the existence of a split award equilibrium:
Lemma 2. There exists an amount x of spectrum and a split award such that in







j , for some j ∈ {1,2,...n}
i.e., for the duopoly case B(α) > B(1) for some α ∈ [0,1). (34)
Proof. We prove this for identical ﬁrms. First we work out the unconstrained CNE
for this case. Each ﬁrm then puts Q = q + ˜ Q and takes the output of others, ˜ Q as
given. Maximizing π = Pq − c(q) = (a − b(q + ˜ Q)q − ca − dq2, this gives a reaction
function
q =
a − b ˜ Q − c
2(b + d)
. (35)
















It follows that as the number of ﬁrms gets large, price tends to marginal cost. At







To prove the Lemma set x = QNE so that the demand for spectrum in the
CNE is just met without any spare capacity. The spectrum manager must compare
the total operating proﬁts in this equilibrium with an equal split (since all ﬁrms are
identical) with that under under monopoly where some spectrum is left spare. Total
operating proﬁts are then
π
M = (a − c)Q








































(QNE)2 ≡ F(d). (41)
F(d) > 0 for n ≥ 2, because πM(Q) reaches its maximum at Q = QM. (41) says
that the Lemma holds if there exists a ﬁxed point for the function F(d), say d∗ and
if d > d∗. No doubt, with a bit of eﬀort, one can show generally that F(d) has a
ﬁxed point. Below we produce a numerical example for which this is the case.
In the ﬁgure we have set b = c = 1, a = 2 and n = 2, 3,5. The corresponding
ﬁxed points are dn. In each case for d > dn the Lemma holds. Note that dn is
an increasing function of n. The intuition is that as N increases then so do the
monopoly operating proﬁts, thus increasing the extent of diminishing returns that
would make the gains from output sharing dominate in a CNE.
























Figure 1: Fixed Points of F(d)
7.2 Split Award Auction: Asymmetric Duopoly for z = 0
Now we have to solve for the full CNE allowing for the capacity constraints set
out in section 2. Solving this problem and noting that bids at zero output satisfy
p1(0) = p2(1) = 0 we have reaction functions.
0 ≤ q1 = min [αx, (a − c1 − bq2)/(2(b + d1))] (42)
0 ≤ q2 = min [(1 − α)x, (a − c2 − bq1)/(2(b + d2))]. (43)
Then unused spectrum, ˆ q1 and ˆ q2 respectively, is given by
ˆ q1 = αx − q1 (44)
ˆ q2 = (1 − α)x − q2. (45)
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate these results.13 In these ﬁgures we put x equal to the
total output in the unconstrained NE so that the spectrum manager is allowing for
13We set a = 3, b = 1, c1 = 0.5, c2 = 0.85, d1 = 0.1, d2 = 0.2.
20this output with an appropriate split. Joint operating proﬁts for any (α,x,z) are now
denoted by B(α,x,z). From ﬁgure 2 there is a collusive split award equilibrium at
α∗ = 0.94 and in ﬁgure 2 we see that ﬁrm 1 has spare capacity at this split. There are
other possible non-collusive split award equilibria at which B(α,x,0) ≥ B(1,x,0).
In this example these exist for α ∈ [0.9,1]. The existence of spare spectrum in
equilibrium highlights an important diﬀerence between the procurement and spectrum
sale problems. In the former the scale of output is given, but in the latter the quantity
of service provided depends on the equilibrium split.
7.3 Split Award Auction: Asymmetric Duopoly for z > 0
With z = 0 we have seen that a split-award equilibrium only exists if there is
suﬃciently decreasing returns to scale. Now consider the case of z > 0 in which case
the capacities at the production stage of the game are given by
r1 = z + α(x − 2z) ∈ [z, x − z]; r2 = z + (1 − α)(x − 2z) ∈ [z, x − z]. (46)
First consider the unconstrained Nash equilibrium which is the outcome at this
stage of the game provided that x−z is suﬃciently large. From the reaction functions




2(a − c1)(b + d2) − b(a − c2)




2(a − c2)(b + d1) − b(a − c1)
4(b + d1)(b + d2) − b2 . (48)
The question we now pose is whether there exists some α ∈ [0,1) such that for
some values of x and z <
x
2, and parameters a, b, ci > 0 and di ≥ 0 or di ≤ 0 we
have that B(α,z,x) ≡ π1(α,z,x)+π2(α,z,x) > B(1,z,x)? The key to showing that
this in fact can happen is to assume that x and z are chosen so that
q
NE
2 < z ≤ r2 = z + (1 − α)(x − 2z) (49)
q
NE
1 > x − z ≥ r1 = z + α(x − 2z). (50)
21Then ﬁrm 2 is unconstrained and ﬁrm 1 is constrained for all α ∈ [0,1]. It follows
from the reaction function of ﬁrm 2 that the equilibrium is given by
q1 = z + α(x − 2z) (51)
q2 =
(a − c2 − bq1)
2(b + d2)
(52)
P = a − b(q1 + q2) (53)
πi = (P − ci)qi − diq
2
i , i = 1,2. (54)
To make the analysis more tractable, ﬁrst consider the case of constant returns




(P − 2c1 + c2) +
(P − c2)(a − c2)
2b
. (55)




















The ﬁrst term on the right-hand-side is positive and represents the eﬀect of increasing
output by giving the more eﬃcient ﬁrm 1 more capacity. The second term is negative









(2(c2 − c1) − bq1). (57)
Substituting for q1 from (51) we arrive at the following proposition:
Proposition 4. For constant returns to scale, a collusive split-award equilibrium
exists at α = α∗ where
α
∗ =
2(c2 − c1) − bz
b(x − 2z)
, (58)
provided (49) and (50) hold and c2, c1, b, z and x are such that α∗ ∈ (0,1).
7.4 Numerical Illustration and Comparison of Auctions
In Figures 4 to 6 we illustrate these results for the Split Award Auction. We ﬁrst
assume constant returns to scale (d1 = d2 = 0) and as before choose a = 3, c1 = 0.5,
22c2 = 0.85, b = 1. Then qNE
1 = 0.63 and qNE
2 = 0.40. Then choose z = 0.44 and
x = 1.01 so that qNE
2 < z,qNE
1 and x > 2z. Then the conditions for proposition
4 are satisﬁed and from (58), α∗ = 0.2 which is conﬁrmed in the ﬁgure. Figure 5
now allows for decreasing returns to scale by putting d1 = 0.1 and d2 = 0.2 with
remaining parameters unchanged. Now the ﬁrms beneﬁt by shifting capacity more
to the more eﬃcient ﬁrm and the split award equilibrium rises to α∗ = 0.53.
Figure 6 adds revenue to ﬁgure 4 with and without the initial bidding stage.
In ﬁgure 6 we set the marginal cost of the third ﬁrm at c3 = 0.9, compared with
c2 = 0.85. The bid as deﬁned in section 5 is ξ = 0.005 which sees the regulator
acquiring over half the joint operating proﬁts. However this results is critically
dependent on how contestable the market is and in particular how close c3 is to c2.
c3 Π3(α∗(1,3)) α∗(1,3) SA Revenue BK Revenue
0.90 0.0025 0.6 0.8500 0.6546
0.95 0.0012 0.8 0.8487 0.6067
1.00 0.0004 0.9 0.8479 0.5704
1.05 0 1.0 0.8475 0.5375
Table 1. Comparisons of Revenues from Split Award (SA) and
Binmore-Klemperer (BK) Auctions
Table 1 shows what happens as the market becomes less contestable as c3 rises
and we compare the revenues for the Split Award and Binmore-Klemperer auctions,
the latter with an even split. For the former we see that the initial bid price falls
sharply until at c3 = 1.05 it disappears altogether and then stage 1 adds no more to
the revenue. From (17), (25) and (32) 1 the total revenue split for the split award
(SA) auction and Binmore-Klemperer (BK) auctions are given by
SA Revenue = Π3(α
∗(1,3))
      
Stage 1 Revenue
+B(0) + B(1) − B(α
∗(1,2))
      
Stage 2 Revenue
(59)
BK Revenue = π3(2,3) (60)
It is diﬃcult to compare these revenues analytically, but table 1 provides a numerical
comparison for this particular set of parameters with x−2z chosen so as to result in
23a split award outcome. The results suggest that the SA auction results in a higher
revenue than the BK auction. For this example this is not the result of the ﬁrst stage
bid of the SA which does not increase revenue a lot. Rather it comes about because
of the ability of the auctioneer to extract a sizable proportion of total operating
proﬁts in a collusive split equilibrium at stage 2 of the game.
The higher revenue however comes at a cost. In the SA equilibrium in our
example with constant returns to scale it is required that the eﬃcient ﬁrm 1 is
constrained for all possible splits but the ineﬃcient ﬁrm 2 is not (conditions (49)
and (50)) In the collusive equilibrium we then have more spectrum allocated to the
unconstrained ineﬃcient ﬁrm, some of which is subsequently unused. This means
that the BK auction with an equal split imposed results in higher output and a lower




















c3 CSSA RSA PSSA CSBK RBK PSBK
0.90 0.6700 0.8500 0.0022 0.7057 0.6546 0.2465
0.95 0.6700 0.8487 0.0035 0.7057 0.6067 0.2944
1.00 0.6700 0.8479 0.0043 0.7057 0.5704 0.3307
1.05 0.6700 0.8475 0.0047 0.7057 0.5375 0.3636
Table 2. Comparisons of Welfare in Split Award (SA) and
Binmore-Klemperer (BK) Auctions
Figure 7 compares the price and consumer surplus for the SA and BK auctions
using (61). Table 2 provides a welfare breakdown for various marginal costs of
the third ﬁrm, c3, into consumer surplus (CS), revenue (R) and producer surplus
(PS) deﬁned as total operating proﬁts for the two ﬁrms minus total spectrum costs
(equals revenue). These results highlight a further important diﬀerence between the
24mechanisms: the revenue in the BK auction is totally dependent on the eﬃciency
of the third ﬁrm whereas in the SA auction even in the absence of a competitive
third ﬁrm the auctioneer can still extract substantial revenue at stage 2. Total social
welfare (CS+R+PS) is higher for the BK auction unless we allow for a shadow cost
of public funds arising from the distortionary impact of alternative forms raising
revenue from taxes (see Laﬀont and Tirole (1993)). If however the auctioneer is only
concerned with consumer surplus plus revenue, the SA auction is clearly preferable
in our example.
8 Conclusions
Treating spectrum of diﬀerent bandwidths as essentially two distinct inputs needed
for possibly diﬀerent types of services has formed the core of spectrum analysis in
academic research so far. The E2R approach to spectrum allocation is to move
away from this inﬂexibility and to open up the new technological possibility of
making diﬀerent spectrum bands compatible. Spectrum, it is envisaged, is to become
divisible and homogeneous. Auctions for this case have not been previously analyzed.
Our analysis has shown that the split-award spectrum auction for homogeneous
divisible spectrum closely resembles the mirror image of the Anton–Yao procurement
auction, but with one important diﬀerence: whereas for procurement, the scale of the
the project (i.e., the output in the downstream market is given), for the allocation
of spectrum the total output of radio services using spectrum as an input depends
on the strategic interaction of the producers. In particular we have found split-
award equilibria in which spectrum is under-utilized despite being chosen to be just
suﬃcient to service the unconstrained Nash equilibrium in the ﬁnal market stage of
the game.
We have completed the characterization of the equilibria of both the splt award
(SA) and Binmore-Klemperer (BK) auction for the complete information case. We
have shown that a split-award collusive equilibrium exists for certain certain conﬁg-
urations of parameters. The comparison with the BK auction suggests that the split
25award auction can deliver both signiﬁcantly higher revenue and higher revenue plus
consumer surplus. Furthermore the revenue in the BK auction is totally dependent
on the competition from the most eﬃcient third ﬁrm that drops out in the bidding
stage.
There a number of interesting areas for future research including: a generalization
of the analysis to the case of incomplete information; a study of other government
objectives that include considerations of expected consumer and producer surpluses
in addition to revenue; the consideration of substitution in the production stage
between spectrum and other inputs and ﬁnally the introduction of a further fourth
stage of bilateral trading in the game.
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Figure 2: z = 0 and Decreasing Returns to Scale: Total Operating Proﬁts
B(α,x,0)








































Figure 3: z=0 and Decreasing Returns to Scale: Spare Spectrum Capacity,
ˆ q1 and ˆ q2.












































Figure 4: z > 0 and Constant Returns to Scale: Total Operating Proﬁts
B(α,x,z)













































Figure 5: z > 0 and Decreasing Returns to Scale: Total Operating Proﬁts,
B(α,x,z)
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REVENUE WITHOUT INITIAL BID 
REVENUE WITH INITIAL BID 
Figure 6: z > 0 and Constant Returns to Scale: Total Operating Proﬁts
and Revenue B(α,x,z) and g. c3 = 0.9










































Figure 7: z > 0 and Constant Returns to Scale: Price and Consumer
Surplus. c3 = 0.9
30